Is equality really so difficult?

Equality is not the same as sameness.  We can easily imagine a society in which all available resources would be carefully rationed and parceled out in equal portions to every individual member.  Everyone would receive exactly the same amount and quality of food, the same size of room and bed, the same frequency of health checkups, the same quality and duration of education, the same number of working hours with the same precisely-defined breaks, the same clothes and haircuts, and the same opportunities for social interaction, leisure and recreation.  A society of such strictly-defined equality in all things would be monstrously dull and uninspiring.  (Rather like boot-camp for life.)  Not only would individuals be kept from the things they valued more than the things they were given, they would be saddled with things they had no use for.  Such a society might even turn out materially poorer for everyone, in terms of prosperity and opportunity, though it is impossible to know because such a society has never been observed—not even in a communist regime.  And of course not everyone’s needs are exactly the same—some require more calories than others, some more medical care.  Some would happily give up a bigger house for more leisure hours, while others would prefer the opposite.  So the first thing we can agree on is that equality should not be pursued rigidly and dogmatically through some strict central-planning regime.  And equality cannot be idolized as if it were the only human value.  It will have to share space with other social goods.

And we can recognize that inequality is not always a bad thing.  There are many positive terms that we often put in its place.  We agree that diversity is a good thing, though the concept would make little sense without social difference, even disparity.  We consider opportunity a good thing, though opportunity suggests only a potentially good outcome, a condition as yet unrealized.  If opportunity were guaranteed equally to all it would be called a right, though without intrusive supports and sanctions we would expect that such a hoped-for good might not be realized at all.  Thus the consequences of opportunity must necessarily be unknown, the various outcomes and possibilities incomparable, and ultimately unequal if the term is to have meaning.  We also value individuality, the notion that our personal identity is unique, different from the identities of those around us.  Some are better dancers, some better singers, some better drummers, some better writers, some better managers—yet all may prosper in the same band and make it more successful than if each member had exactly the same talents as the others.  And likewise in society at large—a diversity of talents and interests—everyone’s existence is made richer and more interesting than it would otherwise have been.  It’s hard to argue that individuality and differentness are good things, even within collectives.  The larger the society, the more diversity it will require to bring about a satisfying range of abilities, skills and viewpoints.  Yet individualism and equality are difficult to reconcile, sometimes provoking violent social disagreements.  Since both are highly desirable goals, and neither can be sacrificed without destroying civility itself, a balance must be worked out, negotiated, agreed to.  This is where civil society becomes challenging—and where perfect equality becomes less desirable than when considered in the abstract.  And this means that our social commitment to equality will necessarily be tempered by our competing desires for individual identity, for personal growth and sovereignty, and for cultural inheritances and traditional values that we also hold in affection.  Equality cannot be an absolute good.  An absolute good can never be compromised or diminished in any way.  Equality will have to give up some of what it wants.

So let’s bear in mind that some manifestations of inequality are better than the likely alternatives.  We can probably agree that it is better to be moderately unequal than to live in a society of dull conformists and indistinguishable cogs.  Better to craft meaningful guarantees of personal freedom than to be equal and unfree.  Better to give up some aspects of equality (such as equality of wealth) with the promise that we will be able to spend more of our time developing and maximizing our unequal talents, such as musical or artistic passions.

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The challenge we face as a civil society is to maximize the equality of access and opportunity of all the many members of our shared civil society without unduly inhibiting the diversity, choice and distinctiveness that these same individuals or associations of individuals also demand.  Let us agree (for the moment) that a healthy and enduring society requires diversity and difference, and thus some measure of inequality.  But let us acknowledge that a healthy and meaningful democracy requires some fundamental equalities among its members, and that a society agreeing to such equalities must find ways of encouraging and protecting them.  So what kinds of equality are fundamental to the life of a civil democracy?

Equality under the law.  This may seem too obvious to mention, but in truth it is a rather new idea to our modern world, so should not pass unnoticed.  The very notion of citizenship for all is a recent idea.  The Romans did not extend citizenship to all the free inhabitants of their empire until quite late in their history, some 200 hundred years after Paul of Tarsus had boasted of his citizenship.  Even this grant did nothing for the enormous population of slaves, and gave little to women.  Most kingdoms and states since have reserved very distinct legal recognitions to different orders of society, or to regions—these were precisely the inequalities that the French Revolution arose to overthrow, though the subsequent Napoleonic Civil Code still awarded superior rights to male heads of families.  The modern notion of legal equality means that every individual member of society receives the same quality of legal protections, expectations and rights as the rest—even non-naturalized residents.  Only formal legal proceedings—criminal trials—can deprive members (never groups) of their rights and freedoms.  No modern civil democracy can tolerate slavery in any form.  And yet even this fundamental equality is not always observed.

Equality of services.  Every modern citizen will also enjoy roughly equal access to public services and the use of public resources.  Every individual citizen must have the same standing before the law as every other citizen—including participation in public deliberations and effective legal advice and representation (since modern law codes are too complicated to be comprehended by most citizens or even lawyers).  In practice, we can see that our courts will have to be made much more accessible to individuals who do not have well-staffed law-firms on retainer.  To achieve something nearer this ideal, Public Defenders will have to be better valued and financed.  The individual right to counsel may have to be constrained in some cases so that private wealth does not determine, sway or delay judicial outcomes.

Equality of access.  Every citizen should have equal access to the services of civil employees, bureaucratic offices, politicians, and to political office itself.  Though acknowledged in the abstract, this equality is violated in practice by inequalities of wealth, education, location and leisure time.  Politicians (and sometimes civil servants) know perfectly well whose support they need to get into office, and the answer is almost never voters at large.  Their names and qualifications would not become known to voters without expensive electoral campaigns.  It need not be so.  For the sake of citizen equality, campaign financing and advertising will have to be more heavily regulated, constrained, financed and supervised.  (And lawsuits cannot be the primary means of managing abuses, since the resources behind them are not equally available to citizens.)  We will have to find better ways of encouraging ordinary citizens to run for office—which means that barriers of money and available time will have to be significantly reduced.

Equality of participation, or at least of the right of participation.  We can imagine a civil society in which basic forms of political participation such as voting are mandatory, even one in which public service and office-holding are obligatory (as military service is in some states).  Such requirements may even be desirable for democratic well-being.  But most modern democracies do not compel such levels of participation.  At the very least, a democratic society (meaning more than just the government in power) must take active measures to maximize voter registration, voter awareness and ease of access to polling locations.  This cannot be left entirely to political parties and private organizations.  In practice, it means blocking attempts by interest groups and elites to restrict or diminish the votes of individuals and rival interest groups.  Gerrymandering is already far too open and prevalent in wealthy democracies, the consequence of the capture of redistricting policies by motivated interest groups (specifically political parties).  Census gathering and redistricting must be turned over to professional, non-partisan bodies that are transparent and publicly accountable.

We can expect subtle resistance from well-placed elites to such universal rights.  Still, these have been the straightforward ones.

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Equality of opportunity?  Most people will probably agree that equality of opportunity is a good thing (even those who object to the notion of equality of outcome), conservatives and progressives alike.  Every individual should have a fair chance to become everything they imagine they might become.  There should be no legal or social barriers to their potential self-realization.  So far, so easy.  Still, this kind of equality is less obvious than it may appear.  What barriers exactly are getting in the way of individual opportunities?  How do we reduce or eliminate these barriers without actively removing the advantages that the privileged already enjoy?  (Does conservatism include conserving the present advantages of elites and comfortable majorities?  It is the very essence of conservatism.  But such advantages—not shared in practice by all—constitute barriers to the opportunities of the rest.)  And if not through deconstructing the advantages of the advantaged, how exactly would equality of opportunity be realized?  Should we as a society be trying to reduce inequality—through the removal of advantages, such as minimal inheritance taxes—or should we be actively trying to introduce more equality?  The two are not at all the same.  The second—call it progressivism in its milder forms and socialism in its harder forms—requires much more of intrusive governmental oversight and coercion.  But so too does a regime that actively enforces a highly unequal society—by way of policing, incarceration, exclusion, and other social costs.  It may be that the argument about more or less government is really a distraction.  The proper debate is about where we direct our governmental resources—to protecting existing inequalities (heavy-handed policing and income tax cuts) or to improving opportunities for the least advantaged.

We have measures available that reduce inequality directly or else the social damages that result from an excessively-unequal society.  Education is the first.  Public support of education does not seem controversial on the face of it—what advanced nation would argue against its benefits?—yet the specific policies that follow from the implementation of this acknowledged benefit are highly contentious.  How much control should local jurisdictions have over educational policy and content?  (Local school taxes are the norm in many jurisdictions, yet one of the surest means of entrenching existing inequalities.)  Should parents get to choose the style and content of their child’s education?  To what degree should interest groups, including faith organizations, have a say?  These questions matter.  If social opportunities for individuals are to become even passingly equal, educational opportunities must be made more broadly equal.  Governments are the only actors who can make them broadly so, even if merely enforcing more competition among providers.  Health is another.  Poor access to health resources in childhood will impact the individual’s life chances and earnings.  Poor health and shorter life spans impact the well-being of entire societies.  For there to be any meaningful chance of equality of opportunity, health provision cannot be left to the present resources of individuals and families.

Suppose we were to create a public fund that provided free university tuition (and associated educational costs) equally to all members of a society.  Such an opportunity would presumably lay the foundation for the future benefits associated with such an education—to the individual, to her descendants, to the society that reaped the benefits of her acquired skills.  Would this not be an example of near-perfect equality of opportunity for all the members of a society?  Not necessarily.  Who would likely benefit?  The offer, though freely offered to all, would not necessarily be taken up equally by all.  It would be used by those who fully recognized and valued the opportunity it provided—that is, those most likely to pursue such an opportunity even if it were not freely or equally available.  This would include elite groups who never needed the incentive (and might resent the loss of advantage).  It would also include the upper middle classes who had always regarded elite education as the best means of entering the ranks of the elite (and had happily borne significant costs to gain such advantage).  It would least likely include those social groups furthest from the elite who had never learned to appreciate such opportunities.  Would those mostly likely to gain by such an opportunity even think to take advantage of it?  It’s hard to want things that are not already desired or familiar.  A small proportion of the least advantaged would benefit, though perhaps not many.  Those who would actually benefit could better be helped by other measures—more generous bursaries and scholarships, for example.  But the opportunity of free tuition would be valued most by those who had least need of it.  (Which is why middle-class voters often respond enthusiastically to promises of free university tuition.)  To actually fix the problem that free university tuition is meant to address, a society would have to begin much earlier—with very young children and with family expectations.  That is just one reason why systemic inequality is so intractable.  We cannot bring about a more durable equality without first changing the underlying culture.